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Abstract
This paper, based on empirical research in 120 subsidiaries of
American, German and Japanese Multinational Companies, examines the
trend towards the convergence in organizational practices and decision-
making among three types of the multinational corporations. The results
show that the global rationalization drive is equally persued by the
American, German and the Japanese countries. And such practices are
likely to create more tensions and conflicts between the multinationals
and nation-states.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS' QUEST FOR THE GLOBAL
RATIONALIZATION AND MNCS-NATION STATES* RELATIONSHIPS
The multinational corporations' quest for the global reach has led
them to rationalize and unify their production, financial, research and
developmental, and marketing activities. To facilitate such unification
in strategies and policies, the American multinational corporation (MNC)
has changed its organizational structure for managing international busi-
ness from a mere export department to international division, to multi-
national structure with area and/or product concentration, to matrix organ-
izational form, and eventually to a transnational enterprise structure.
A similar trend, with respect to the European and Japanese multi-
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national corporations, has been predicted by Franko and Yoshino.
Although the global rationalization concept has been advocated and
is being implemented, the real attributes, such as the nature of decision-
making, levels of centralization-decentralization in specific areas, the
relative influence of headquarters and overseas subsidiaries and the re-
sulting effectiveness or tensions in their relationships, and the impact
on the MNC-nation states' relationships have not been explored systemati-
cally by many researchers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the components of
the global rationalization processes that are being adopted by the
American, German, and Japanese multinational companies. More specifi-
cally, the following elements are examined in more detail:
(1) Levels of formalization of policies and practices.
(2) Degree of centralization-decentralization and the relative
influence of the headquarters and subsidiaries in decision-
making.
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(3) Headquarter-subsldiary relationships and the nature of the
critical issues and problem area between them.
(4) Nature of the external problems encountered by the three
types of multinationals in the countries studied.
(5) Implications of global rationalization processes on internal
efficiency and the maintenance of effective external rela-
tionships with the host countries.
Prior to the analysis and discussion of the results of our study, a
word about research methodology and sample may be in order.
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
The project was conceived in a comparative vein; we endeavored to
study American, German, British, Japanese, and Swedish multinationals
and their subsidiaries. Our aim was to collect detailed information on
many aspects of multinational operations at both headquarter and subsid-
iary levels. Subsidiaries of one hundred fifty-eight American, British,
German, Japanese, and Swedish multinationals operating in Europe (West
Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Netherlands),
U.S.A., Mexico, Brazil, India, Iran, and their respective 39 headquarters
were studied. Our sample was restricted to firms that were engaged in
some form of manufacturing activity. Hence, firms in travel, banking,
and other service sectors were omitted from consideration. Firms studied
were selected from various investment directories and listings provided
by the chambers of commerce, governmental agencies, and trade associations,
It is appropriate to make some remarks on the type of sample that
was utilized in the analysis. Ideally, in order to have some confidence
(statistically) in the results, the sample needs to be drawn randomly
and large enough. Matching was impossible as the historical patterns
of American, British, German, Japanese, and Swedish investments have
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been quite different, with Japanese multinationals being a more recent
phenomenon. Accordingly, a conscious, random sampling procedure was not
feasible. However, every firm in the universe was given the same chance
of participating or not participating in the study. In order to increase
the generalization and external validity of the study, considerable sup-
plemental information was obtained concerning the multinational corpor-
ations' activities in those countries. Despite these efforts, the reader
is cautioned to bear the limitations of the sample in mind when reading
through the analyses and discussions.
Indepth interviews were conducted with chief executive officers and
other managerial personnel from all firms that had agreed to participate
in the study. A semi-structured interview guide was utilized to conduct
the interviews. Each interview lasted about four to eight hours on an
average; and in most cases included luncheon and dinner sessions. These
sessions proved to be extremely valuable as the executived tended to re-
lax, and, in narrating episodes related to the organizational functioning,
they revealed significant, though subtle, aspects of their operations.
This paper analyzes the results of the study conducted with 120 sub-
sidiaries of American, German, and Japanese multinational corporations.
The characteristics of these companies are given in Table 1.
INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
We will first examine the level of formalization of policies and
practices, degree of centralization-decentralization, and the relative
influence of the headquarters and the subsidiaries in decision-making,
the headquarter-subsidiary relationships, and the nature of the critical
problems between them. As noted earlier, our aim of examining these
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TABLE 1
PROFILE OF THE COMPANIES STUDIED
Country of Origin
Type of Industry
Heavy Engineering
Light Engineering
Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Electrical and Electronics
Automobile
Tires and Rubber Products
Foods
Mixed-Diversified Trading Companies
with Manufacturing Investments
Ratio of Equity
Wholly Owned
Majority Ownership
50-50 Ownership
Minority Ownership
Size: Number of Employees
5000 and more
1001 to 4999
501 to 1000
201 to 500
101 to 200
100 or less
Information Inadequate
United States Germany Japan
(N=34) (K=45) (N=41)
12 14 2
5 6 14
7 21 4
2 6
6 2 2
3
1 1
32
2
5
11
4
4
3
12
ST
44 31
1
1 5
4
6 2
11 2
9 4
4 9
8 3
3 VV~
26
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elements was to assess the extent of the global rationalization strate-
gies utilized by the three types of multinational corporations, namely
the American, the German, and the Japanese.
In the next section, we will examine the implications of these prac-
tices on the effectiveness of the firm at both the internal and the ex-
ternal levels.
Level of Formalization
To assess the level of formalization in the American, German, and
Japanese multinational companies, three aspects are examined:
(1) The subsidiaries' dependence on manuals, policies, and
procedures supplied by the headquarters;
(2) utilization of these policies and procedures for decision-
making; and
(3) the nature and the frequency of reportings required by the
headquarters
.
Table 2 shows the extent to which the subsidiaries of the American,
the German, and the Japanese multinational companies depended upon the
written policies of the headquarters. An overwhelmingly large number of
the American subsidiaries (88%) relied on the headquarters' policies.
Approximately one-third of the German subsidiaries did the same, while
merely 12 percent of the Japanese subsidiaries utilized the policies
supplied by their headquarters. Conversely, only 6 percent of the
American, 48 percent of the German, and 66 percent of the Japanese sub-
sidiaries indicated a very negligible influence on strategic and policy
decisions affecting their operations.
A similar picture emerges when we examine the influence of the
written policies and procedures (whether those supplied by the head-
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TABLE 2
EXTENT TO WHICH SUBSIDIARIES DEPEND ON THE
WRITTEN POLICIES FROM HEADQUARTERS
MNC-Ownership
Great
Deal
%
To Some
Extent
%
Very Little
to Not at All
%
American (N=33) 88 6 6
German (N=A4) 32 20 48
Japanese (N=40) 12 22 66
Level of Significance .0001
Number of missing observations 3
Total number of observations 120
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quarters and/or modified by the subsidiaries) on actual strategic and
policy-level decisions (see Table 3)
.
One can also evaluate the headquarters' relative influences on the
subsidiaries' operations by examining the nature and frequency of report-
ing required from the subsidiaries' managers.
As it can be seen from Table 4, almost all the American subsidiaries,
and approximately two-thirds of the German and Japanese subsidiaries
studied were required, by their respective headquarters, to provide up-
to-date information on balance sheet, profit and loss figures, production
output, market share, cash and credit positions, inventory levels, and
sales per product. The frequency of reporting was greater for the American
(mostly monthly) than for the German and the Japanese subsidiaries.
It is revealing to note from this table that the only items with
which the subsidiaries were less bothered were the performance reviews
of their personnel and the local socio-economic and political conditions.
In other words, the stress is placed more on those aspects affecting the
short-run financial picture of the company rather than on the factors
affecting the firm's long-term survival and growth.
The analyses of the above three aspects of the formalization clearly
indicate the increasing levels of formalization that are being introduced
by the American multinational companies, while the German MNCs seem to be
catching up with the Americans. The Japanese companies, however, are
still relying on their informal network.
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TABLE 3
EXTENT TO WHICH SUBSIDIARIES DEPEND ON MANUALS, POLICIES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC AND POLICY-LEVEL DECISIONS
MNC-Ovnership
American (N=33)
German (N=44)
Japanese (N=40)
Great
Deal
%
To Some
Extent
%
Very Little
to Not at All
%
88 3 9
32 16 52
10 32 58
Level of Significance .0001
Number of missing observations 3
Total number of observations 120
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TH£ RELATIVE INFLUENCE ON DECISION-MAKING
Centralization versus subsidiary autonomy is a perennial and con-
flicting situation faced by most multinational companies. Increasing
competition in the world market requires some measure of rationalization
of production and marketing processes at a global level, thus requiring
a higher degree of centralization of decision-making at the headquarter
and/or regional headquarter levels. On the other hand, to satisfy the
increasing demands from the host as well as the home countries of the
multinationals necessitates some measure of the subsidiary's autonomy on
strategic decision-making.
To assess the relative influence of the headquarters and subsidiaries
in decision-making, we examined the following factors:
Borrowing from local banks
Use of cash flow by the subsidiary
Extension of credit to major customers
Choosing public accountant
Introduction of new product for local market
Servicing of products sold
Use of local advertising agency
Expansion of production capacity
Pricing decisions
Determining aggregate production schedules
Maintenance of production facilities
Appointment of chief executive
Use of expatriate personnel
Layoff of operating personnel
Training programs for local employees
Tables 5 and 6 provide the raw score and difference in means between
the subsidiary's and the headquarter 's influences on decision-making with
respect to the 15 items referred above. Overall, the subsidiaries seem
to have at least equal influence on decision-making. Here again, as It
can be seen from the tables, American subsidiaries possess the least
autonomy and Japanese subsidiaries the most. The German subsidiaries
are in between those two extremes.
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TABLE 5
THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF SUBSIDIARY
IN DECISION-MAKING*
Item Mean Scores
U.S. Japan Germany
Personnel Training Program 3.8
for your subsidiary
Layoffs of Operating Personnel 4.4
Use of Expatriate Fersonnel 2.7
from Headquarters
Appointment of Chief Executive 1.5
of your subsidiary
Maintenance of Production 3.3
Facilities at subsidiary
Determining Aggregate 3.2
Production Schedule
Expansion of your production 2.5
capacity
Use of local advertising agency 3.9
Servicing of products sold 4.4
Pricing on products sold on 3.0
your local market
Introduction of a new product 2.6
on your local market
Choice of public accountant 2.7
Extension of your credit to 3.7
one of your major customers
Use of cash flow in your 3.2
subsidiary
Your borrowing from local 3.2
banks or financial institutions
4.6
4.1
4.5
4.9 4.4
3.6 2.4
2.8 1.7
4.3 4.8
4.2 4.3
3.5 2.7
4.7 4.5
4.7 4.7
4.5 4.0
3.1
4.6 4.4
4.5 4.3
4.2 3.4
3.6 3.4
Average (means) 3.21 4.19 3.77
*The responses were pre-coded from "1" for "Very Little or No Influence"
to "5" for "Very High Influence".
Source: Authors' interviews
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TABLE 6
RELATIVE INFLUENCE OVER 15 DECISION AREAS:
MEAN SCORE DIFFERENCES*
Item
Differences in Means
U.S. Japan Germany
Personnel training...
Layoffs . .
.
Expatriates . .
.
Appointment of CEO...
Maintenance. .
Production Schedule...
Expansion
Advertising. .
Servicing. .
.
Pricing. .
New Products. ..
Choice of CPA. ..
Credit to Customers...
Use of Cash Flow...
Borrowing from Banks..,
Average (means)
1.1
2.6
-.7
-3.0
.1
-.1
-1.4
1.4
2.5
-.5
-1.2
-.5
1.2
.1
.1
3.1 2.4
3.3 2.7
.2 -1.7
1.6 -3.0
1.8 2.4
1.2 1.9
-.2 -1.2
2.7 2.7
2.9 3.1
1.9 1.3
.8 -.6
1.8 2.4
2.4 2.5
1.7 .3
.5 .1
,11 1.50 1.02
*The figures in the Table represent the differences in means between
the rated subsidiary and HO influence for each of the decision Items, the
means taken over the companies in the identified country category. A posi-
tive number implies a relatively greater influence on the part of the sub-
sidiary, while a negative number indicates greater HQ influence.
Source: Authors' interviews
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However, the picture of the greater autonomy of the subsidiaries
changes once we compared the strategic versus routine decisions. As
shown in Table 7, the relative influence score turns negative for the
strategic decisions for all the three types of subsidiaries.
To probe further, we comuted an overall delegation index by assign-
ing different weights to strategic versus routine decisions. The stra-
tegic decisions were weighed three times as much as the routine decisions.
The weighing factor was chosen to reflect the approximate ratio of time
span of feedback of strategic decisions compared to routine decisions.
Table 8 presents the findings for the overall delegation index and the
extent of delegation provided to the subsidiary's management along with
a set of decisions.
As it can be seen from the table, the overall delegation index is
fairly low in absolute terms. Despite the headquarters' acknowledgment
of a less than perfect understanding of the subsidiary's operation and
its environment, the subsidiary's influence on strategic decision-making
is minimal.
Relatively speaking, the Japanese subsidiaries seem to enjoy greater
autonomy and the U.S. subsidiaries the least. German subsidiaries are
again in between these two extremes.
Critical Problems Between Headquarter-
and Subsidiary-Operations
During interviews with the senior executives of both headquarters
and subsidiaries, we probed into some of the critical problems encountered
in headquarter-subsidiary relationships. Besides examining the nature and
intensity of such focal issues between headquarters and subsidiaries, we
-14-
TABLE 7
RELATIVE INFLUENCE OVER 15 DECISION AREAS:
SELECTED STRATEGIC DECISIONS
Item Overall U.S. Japan Germany Sweden U.K.
Appointment of CEO -2.1 -3.0 -1.6 -3.0 = .4 -1.7
Expansion -.8 -1.4 - .2 -1.2 -.5 -.2
New Products - .2 -1.2 - .8 - .6 .4 .4
Mean -1.3 -1.87 - .33 -1.6 - .17 - .50
Source: Authors' interviews
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also attempted to assess the relative influence of the headquarter and
the subsidiary in resolving the issues.
Approximately one-half of the subsidiaries of the American, German,
and Japanese multinational companies studied indicated that no serious
problems existed in their relationships with the headquarters. Of the 48
critical issues narrated by the subsidiaries* executives, roughly one-third
were concerning the lack of the subsidiary's autonomy in dealing with the
problems faced by them in the host countries; approximately one-fourth of
these issues were concerning capital investment decisions. Table 9 shows
the range of problems between headquarters and subsidiaries.
With respect to the relative influences of headquarters and subsid-
iaries on resolving issues, our results indicated that in approximately
one-half of the cases, headquarters handed down the final decisions, and
in less than one-third of the cases subsidiaries' viewpoint prevailed.
Among the three types of subsidiaries studied, the German and Japanese
subsidiaries seem to have greater influences in resolving issues.
Impact of the Firm's and the Country's Specific Factors
on Decision-Making and Consequences of Autonomy
Both in organization theory and international business areas it has
been shown that the firm's specific factors, such as size, technology,
type of industry as well as the country's specific factors, such as levels
of industrial and economic development, market and other economic condi-
tions prevailing in a given country, the level of government control on
industry, etc., may affect not only the centralization-decentralization
decisions, but also the impact of these decisions on the firm's effi-
ciency
.
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At the present time my colleagues collaborating in this project and
I are further analyzing our composite data to examine the effects of these
factors on the subsidiary's autonomy and the consequences of autonomy on
the firm's efficiency.
Our preliminary analysis suggests the following trends:*
(1) Higher interdependence between the headquarter and the sub-
sidiary, as evidenced through a large account of inter-
company transfer of technology, raw material, semi-finished
and finished goods leads to a lower level of subsidiary-
autonomy.
(2) Subsidiaries located in the developing countries tend to
have somewhat lower autonomy.
(3) Subsidiaries operating in competitive markets tend to have
higher autonomy.
(4) Size of the subsidiary does not affect the level of autonomy.
(5) The nature of product-lines has very marginal effect on the
subsidiary's autonomy.
(6) The subsidiary-autonomy has some effect, but not a very sig-
nificant one, on the firm's profits, growth, and other per-
formance criteria. Tightly controlled subsidiaries are rela-
tively better performers, financially, than the autonomous
subsidiaries. However, a higher subsidiary's autonomy has a
more positive impact on the host country's acceptance of its
operation, thereby improving its eventual growth and sur-
vival potential.
The last finding thus provides a support to the advocators of the
global-rationalization and unification processes of the multinational
corporations. However, at the same time, it raises an intriguing ques-
tion about the utility of such centralization processes under rapidly
*The summary results are drawn from Johnny K. Johansson, et al. s
twin papers "Autonomy of Subsidiaries in Multinational Corporations" to
appear in Lars Otterbeck (editor): The Management of Headquarter -
Subsidiary Relationships in Transnational Corporations . (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-'s'esley) , forthcoming.
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changing socio-economic and political conditions in industrialized as
well as in developing countries. To explore this question further, we
will first examine the changing conditions in the industrialized coun-
tries and then discuss the implications of such changes on multinational
corporations' strategies, policies and structure.
Fast Changing Conditions in Industrialized Countries
Although many of the industrialized countries are operating as "free
and open markets" and are generally very congenial to foreign investors,
lately, they too have begun to question the utility of unchecked foreign
investments. In other words, the governmental decision-makers as well
as other public groups (labor unions, consumer advocates, and environ-
mentalists) are discovering that national needs, ambitions, and objectives
can be at variance with the MNCs * objectives, goals, and strategies.
The range, nature, and intensity of these issues, of course, differ
considerably from country to country, depending upon the prevailing
political climate and economic conditions (unemployment, inflation,
balance of payment position) and the level of industrial and economic
development. For example, in a study of MNCs in developed countries,
Fry reported that the issue of worker-participation ("Mitbestimmung")
was most prominent in West Germany, and the traditional issues, such as
providing new technology, employment, upgrading wages, and the develop-
ing local resources were considered secondary by the governmental offi-
cials.
In contrast, in Eelgium the major issues pertaining to the multi-
national corporation's activities were related to employment capabilities,
-20-
potential effect on balance of payments position, research and develop-
ment activities (lack of), development and utilization of local resources,
and worker participation in management. Simultaneously, however, MNCs
emphasized their importance in terms of increasing the entrepreneurial
spirit, providing new technology, and making consumer goods at lower
prices. These differences in expectations between the government and
the multinational corporations' priorities are clearly highlighted in
Table 10.
Particularly, since the oil crisis of 1973, most of the industrial-
ized nations have experienced a downturn in their economic growth and
prosperity, which in turn has created considerable hostility not only
toward foreign multinationals but also among the opposing groups in a
given society (management against labor, domestic multinationals against
foreigh multinationals, and multinationals against their own sub-
contractors). For example, faced with the declining sales of the U.S.
automobiles, all the three big U.S. auto companies (G.M., Ford, and
Chrysler) have begun to denounce auto imports from Japan and European
countries and asked the U.S. Congress and the President to help. At
the same time, their own sub-contractors have publicly accused auto
companies as "double talkers" by asserting that "it is not just imported
cars, it's imported parts that is causing problems." The growing com-
plaints ever Detroit's policies of importing parts for domestically as-
sembled cars have now reached Washington. Consequently, congressional
proposals that were originally designed to limit imports of autos are
being amended to place restriction on imported parts also.
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TABLE 10
EXPECTATION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATION-STATES
Impact
Worker Participation
Increase Competition
Capital Inflows
Increase Skilled Employment
Creat Entrepreneurial Spirit
Germany
Government Wants More Firms Give More
X
X
X
X
Impact
Increase General Employment
Increase Skilled Employment
Balance of Payment Effects
Increase R&D Efforts
Develop Local Resources
Worker Participation
Increase Quality of Consumer
Services
Social & Cultural Values
Increase Entrepreneurial Spirit
Provide New Technology
Create Lower Prices
Belgium
Government Wants More Firms Give More
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source: David E. Fry. Multinational Corporations - Host Government
Relationships: An Empirical Study of Behavioral Expectations .
Unpublished D.B.A. dissertation, Kent State University, 1977.
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The results of our own large-scale study reported in Table 11, il-
lustrate the nature of demands made by the multinational companies in
West Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and France.
As can be seen from this table, economic stagnation, triggered by
the oil crisis, has generated traditional economic demands even in the
more industrialized nations of the world. However, except in the case
of Spain and Portugal, the European countries, in which this field re-
search was undertaken, have not yet legislated these demands.
However, one thing appears clear: the less economically developed
a country, and/or more intensive the economic problems, the more demands
are placed on multinational corporations, and the more willing the country
will be to legislate these expectations.
Table 12 shows the nature of problems faced by the American, German,
and Japanese KNCs in various industrialized countries. The labor force
seems to be the source of almost half the problems faced by the multi-
nationals. However, U.S. and German subsidiaries have, proportionately,
more labor problems than Japanese companies. The underlying theme of
labor-management problems is, however, quite different in the various
countries. In Germany, for instance, industry-representatives were
involved in challenging the constitutional validity of the "codetermina-
tion" laws, and influencing the election of representatives who were
against the codetemination laws. The U.S. multinational subsidiaries,
owing to workforce-size stipulations in the law, were most susceptible
to the laws. Given the confrontationary nature of management-labor
relations in the United States, American multinationals initially had
a difficult time accepting the collaborative philosophy.
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TABLE 11
NATURE OF DEMANDS MADE ON MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES*
•
Germany
N/%
U.K.
N/%
2/21.4
Spain
N/%
0/0.0
Portugal
N/%
France
N/%
0/0.0
Total
Technology Transfer 0/0.0 0/0.0 3/5.3
Exports 0/0.0 1/7.1 0/0.0 0/0.0 1/12.5 2/3.5
Employment 0/0.0 2/14.3 0/0.0 0/0.0 0/0.0 2/3.5
Economic Development 3/23.1 5/35.7 10/90.9 9/81.8 7/87.5 34/59.6
Ambivalent 1/7.7 0/0.0 0/0.0 0/0.0 0/0.0 1/1.8
No Specific Demands 9/69.2 3/21.4 1/9.1 2/2.18 0/0.0 15/26.3
13/22.8 14/24.6 11/19.3 11/19.3 8/14.0 57/100
*Raw Chi Square = 43.19530 with 20 degrees of freedom. Significance = 0.0019.
Source: Interview data collected by the authors.
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Outside Germany all multinationals, especially the larger U.S. and
German multinationals, have been the targets of leftist-ideology-oriented
labor unions. This has been particularly true of Spain and Portugal
where rising nationalistic expectations have made the issue even more
difficult to handle. Japanese multinationals appear to have avoided
serious problems with labor, to some extent, by their smaller size and
their willingness to go into joint ventures with either government or-
ganizations or private entrepreneurs. This finding is interesting in
the light of the fact that, despite being involved in joint ventures or
minority holdings in the developing countries, Japanese organizations
ghave had considerable problems with labor. These problems stemmed
mainly from historical factors and efforts made by Japanese to impose
their management style. It appears that the Japanese multinationals
have learned from their experience in the developing countries of Asia
and South America, and have restricted the use of a Japanese management
style (such as life-time employment, and demanding loyalty to the com-
pany) in the industrialized countries.
Japanese subsidiaries were involved, however, in conflicts with the
EEC commission. Problems were centered around charges of "dumping" by
Japanese organizations, despite the fact that the accused Japanese com-
panies had manufacturing subsidiaries in the EEC countries. The Japanese
organizations responded by adopting a legalistic stance while simultan-
eously emphasizing their local manufacturing activities in efforts to
make the "dumping" charge untenable.
As noted earlier, although the industrially-developed countries have,
thus far, constrained themselves in enacting limiting legislations against
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foreign private investments and multinational corporations, the public
debates and discussions are moving closer to this end at a faster speed
than one would have anticipated. For example, the recent establishment
9
of the Foreign Investment Review Agency in Canada and their pronounce-
ments of expected corporate behavior, as seen from Table 13, comes very
close to what the developing countries have been demanding from foreign
investors during the last two decades.
Turning to the United States, as the unemployment and inflation con-
tinue to undermine the people's confidence in national economic condi-
tions, the legislators both at the state and national levels have begun
to introduce legislations to curb the activities of foreign investors
and multinational companies. For example, in the last few years, approx-
imately one-half of the 50 states in the United States have introduced
legislations to restrict foreign investments in agricultural lands. At
a lesser end, as mentioned earlier, the sub-contractors of U.S. automobile
companies as well as the labor unions have begun to question the virtue
of multinational investments and their general strategies of global
rationalization.
Our results of the study, on the other hand, clearly show the in-
creasing trend toward global rationalization and centralization in deci-
sion-making. Thus, the question one needs to ask is whether the German
and Japanese multinationals are flexible enough to turn the tide and
maintain their flexible structures and responses, as they have been able
to do in the developing countries, once the circumstances demand them to
do so in the industrialized countries?
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TABLE 13
CANADA'S 12 GOOD CORPORATE BEHAVIOR PRINCIPLES (AS THEY RELATE
TO ALLEGED OBJECTIONABLE U.S. SUBISIDIARY POLICIES
Guiding Principle Summary
1. Full realization of the company's
growth and operating potential in
Canada.
2. Make Canadian subsidiary self-con-
tained, vertically-integrated
entity with total responsibility
for at least one productive
function.
3. Maximum development of export
markets from Canada.
Alleged Objectionable Practices
1. U.S.-based corporate planners insti-
tute expansion and cutback plans
without regard for Canada's plan
and aspirations.
2. The Canadian subsidiary is primarily
an assembler of imported parts or
distributor of goods produced else-
where so operations can be easily
shut down or transferred.
3. Filling export orders to third-
country markets from the U.S. country
stock earns credits for U.S. balance
of payments rather than Canada's.
4. Have as few materials-processing
stages as possible in Canada to min-
imize political leverage.
5. Negotiated or spurious prices by
Canadian-U.S . subsidiaries are de-
designed to get around Canadian in-
come taxes.
6. Preference for United States or
third-country sources for purposes
of corporate convenience or politi-
cal leverage.
7. The concentration of R & D and product
design in the United States mean
Canada can never develop these capa-
bilities.
8. Profits earned in Canada do not stay
to finance Canadian expansion.
9. Use of U.S. officers and directors to
prevent development of local outlook
in planning and execution.
10. Creation of wholly owned subsidiaries
denies policy determination and earn-
ings to Canadians.
11. Consolidation of Canadian operating
results into parent company statement
or failure to publish any relevant
information.
12. Failure locally to support such causes
as the United Appeal where parent cor-
porations give generously to comparable
U.S. campaigns.
Source: David J. Ashton, "U.S. Investments in Canada: Will the Other Shoe Drop?"
Worldwide P & I Planning , September-October (1968), p. 57.
4. Extend processing of Canada's raw
materials through maximum number
of stages.
5. Equitable pricing policies for inter-
national and intracompany sales.
6. Develop sources of supply in
Canada.
7. Inclusion of R & D and product
development.
8. Retain substantial earnings for
growth.
9. Appointment of Canadian officers
and directors.
10. Equity participation by Canadian
investing public.
11. Publication of financial reports.
12. Support of Canadian cultural and
charitable institutions.
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Even the American multinationals, the champion of evolving progres-
sive organizational structures for managing expanding international busi-
ness (from export department to international division, regional struc-
ture, worldwide product set-up, and the matrix system) have been warned
about the swiftly changing environmental conditions in both the developed
and the developing countries.
Business International, a reputed consulting firm in international
business, recently identified some of the major economic and political
changes which will affect the need for changes in present organizational
forms utilized by American and other multinational companies.
Declining or Stagnant Economic Growth in Industrialized Countries
On the average, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, will experience their real growth in GNP
drop from about three percent in 1979, to one percent in 1980. The U.S.
GNP growth may drop from two percent in 1979, to 1.25 percent in 1980;
Japan from six percent in 1979, to 4.75 percent; West Germany from three
percent to two percent; Canada from 2.75 percent to 1.5 percent; and the
United Kingdom from 0.5 percent to a two percent decline. ~ While the
growth rates in major industrialized countries are declining, the infla-
tion continues to soar. Thus, the poorer future outlook, and the higher
inflation rates, are likely to reinforce protectionist forces in the
12
United States and other developed countries.
Given such changing economic and political conditions, Business
International warns that the multinational corporations will have to
go back to the drawing boards and create a responsive organizational
-29-
structure which could combine the centralization of strategies and
13policies with increasing decentralization of subsidiary operations.
Whether the German and the Japanese companies, in their quest for
adopting the American model of the global rationalization will be able
to achieve a marriage between the centralization of strategies and
policies (as required by the global rationalization concept) and the
needed decentralization or higher autonomy of the subsidiary operations,
is an open question awaiting the attention of the academic scholars as
we move into the 1980s.
-30-
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